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THE ROLE OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY IN MODERN
DEATH PENALTY CASES
Bruce Ledewitz*
Scott Staples**
When a governor commutes a sentence of death, typically to one
of life imprisonment either with an extended mandatory term or
without possibility of parole, how is this action to be understood?
As former Governor Pat Brown's book about his commutation de-
cisions illustrates,' in a period of widespread support for the death
penalty, each commutation contains an appeal for popular support
and understanding as to why the decision was made. Where the
case for commutation cannot be made to the public's satisfaction, a
governor is not likely to act.
Opponents of the death penalty have complained during the
modern post-Gregg v. Georgia2 era that governors rarely exercise
their commutation power. It does appear that governors now com-
mute death sentences less frequently than in prior periods. The
infrequency may root in public officials' inability to place commu-
tation in a context that is intelligible to the public.
Our ideas about commutation reflect the assumptions of an ear-
lier death penalty era. As the nature of the death penalty changed,
the justification for commutation should have, but has not,
changed with it. The resulting conceptual incoherence goes beyond
not having good reasons for commutation in a particular case and
reaches the fundamental question of what is a satisfactory reason
for commutation in the first place. A new understanding of com-
mutation, if accepted by the public, could result in widespread use
of the commutation process.
* Professor, Duquesne University School of Law.
** Assistant Professor of Psychology, Duquesne University.
1. EDMUND G. (PAT) BROWN WITH DICK ADLER, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A GOVER-
NOR'S EDUCATION ON DEATH Row (1989) [hereinafter BROWN WITH ADLER].
2. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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A. The Structure of Executive Clemency
Although the word "clemency" applies to both reduction of a
sentence and pardon of a conviction, obviously there is a tremen-
dous difference between the two actions. There is also a dramatic
difference between a reduction in a term of years and a commuta-
tion of a death sentence. In this paper, we discuss only commuta-
tion of a sentence of death to a term of years.
Typically, a governor has a great deal of discretion whether to
commute a sentence of death. In some jurisdictions, the governor's
commutation decision is entirely discretionary. This is also true at
the federal level. On the other hand, in some states some other
body must concur before a commutation can take place. Governor
Brown writes of hearing at the end of his term from the Chief Jus-
tice of the California Supreme Court that a majority of the justices
would concur in his decision to commute the death sentence of a
prisoner with a record of prior felonies, fulfilling California's re-
quirement of judicial approval. The chief justice explained that the
justices concurred "because they know you won't be able to ask for
any more. ' 3
Even where a governor's authority to commute sentences is for-
mally shared, a governor is likely, as a practical matter, to retain
the dominant voice. In Pennsylvania, for example, the Governor
cannot commute any criminal sentence without the recommenda-
tion of the Board of Pardons.4 Nevertheless, the Governor appoints
several members of the Board5 and for that reason, or perhaps due
to his general influence, the Board tends to follow the Governor's
lead. In death penalty cases, Pennsylvania law apparently gives the
Governor unlimited discretion to sign, or to not sign, a warrant of
execution. Thus, no inmate can be executed without the Gover-
nor's active involvement. Although the precise forms vary in other
states, the Governor typically retains a crucial role in the execution
decision.
Given their considerable discretionary power, one would expect
to see governors who are opponents of the death penalty liberally
using the commutation power to block executions. This expecta-
tion has not been met. Perhaps there are no abolitionists in gover-
3. BROWN WITH ADLER, supra note 1, at 152.
4. PA. CONST. art. IV, § 9(a).
5. Id. § 9(b).
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nors' mansions. Alternately, governors may assume that wholesale
commutations would be political suicide. As Governor Brown has
explained, part of the reason is the feeling that commuting all
death sentences would violate a "trust to uphold [the] constitution
and [the] laws . . ." of the State."
It is odd that more governors do not seize upon their right to act
upon grounds of general moral commitment. A governor who com-
mutes death sentences on policy grounds does not frustrate the law
any more than does a governor who vetoes a death penalty bill
based upon personal opposition to underlying legislative policy.
The legislature or the voters are free to rescind or limit such gu-
bernatorial discretion. But where the discretion exists, it can be
used on any basis that does not violate constitutional rights. In any
event, although the straight abolition model of commutation is
plausible, we will not discuss it in this paper. At least for the mo-
ment, that model does not exist.7
B. The Changing Morality of the Death Penalty
Historically, in America, the dominant death penalty structure
was a mandatory penalty for certain classes of crimes, subject to
executive review. The crimes for which death most commonly im-
posed were murder, rape and, later, kidnapping.8 This context
shaped the American legal system's ideas about commutation.
Neither death penalty proponents nor abolitionists seem to un-
derstand the significance of mandatory imposition of the death
penalty. Although state laws have moved away from mandatory
capital sentences, death penalty proponents and the general public
still tend to speak of acts whose performance merits execution. As
will be discussed below, when imposition of the death penalty is
not based upon an act deserving of death, then the legal system is
relying upon judgments about the nature of a particular defendant
6. BROWN WITH ADLER, supra note 1, at 142.
7. The experience of Toney Anaya, Governor of New Mexico, comes closest to the aboli-
tion model. Governor Anaya commuted all death sentences at the end of his term, as a sort
of good-bye to political life. More typical is the example of Dick Riley, Governor of South
Carolina from 1982 to 1986. Though opposed to the death penalty, Governor Riley allowed
executions to proceed throughout his term. His fear of political backlash was not unfounded.
For example, it is widely believed that Michael DiSalle, Governor of Ohio, lost his 1962 race
for re-election in large part because of six death penalty commutations. See Daniel T. Kobil,
The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wrestling the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEx. L.
REv. 569, 607-08 (1991).
8. These are the so-called "Little Lindbergh laws."
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that are surely impossible to make.' In contrast, a mandatory
death penalty proclaims that certain criminal acts are deserving of
death, regardless of the defendant's nature. Mandatory death pen-
alties parallel a view of Biblical law and, in murder cases, they par-
allel the Biblical lex talionis, life for life.' 0
Where mandatory death penalties exist, executive commutation
also functions biblically. Commutation is an act of grace in this
context. Commutation is never deserved because the mandatory
penalty dictates that death is deserved. A governor may consider
factors suggesting a merciful sentence, such as particular difficul-
ties in the prisoner's life at the time of the crime, a goading per-
sonal relationship with the victim, or the use of alcohol and drugs.
Nevertheless, a prisoner has no right to have these factors consid-
ered. The legal system has determined that such inmates deserve
to die for what they did.
The mandatory death penalty explains the traditional all-or-
nothing approach to the insanity defense. For certain reprehensi-
ble crimes, if a sane prisoner "deserved" any punishment at all,
that punishment was death. Conversely, a small class of mentally
ill individuals did not deserve punishment at all. In this formula-
tion, insane convicts are not treated as truly human. Unlike the
general population, they are not regarded as capable of moral ac-
tion. Most persons are held morally accountable for their acts, sub-
ject to the divine mercy that recognizes man's plight. In some
cases, the agent of mercy is a governor.
The use of mandatory sentencing also explains why totally arbi-
trary acts of executive commutation were tolerated. A governor
might grant hearings or not. A governor may study an inmate's
case or not. A governor might grant many commutations, or only a
few. There was no tradition of examining prior commutations to
establish standards to which a governor later might be called to
adhere. Commutation functioned along the lines of divine grace:
"[I] will show mercy on whom I will show mercy.''
Arbitrary commutation decisions were tolerable under the as-
sumptions of a mandatory death penalty system. In that context,
9. Although not germane to the topic of clemency, the gradual restriction of death pen-
alty eligibility to a small universe of homicides also raises serious issues of justification for
this type of punishment.
10. Exodus 21:23-25.
11. Exodus 33:19.
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the legal system has determined that the prisoner deserves to die.
In certain cases, such as those involving the young or in cases of
intra-family crimes, there might be a widespread feeling that the
governor really should commute the sentence. Even in these in-
stances, however, if a governor failed to do so, no injustice had oc-
curred. Execution still was deserved.
It is difficult to pinpoint when the view that the death penalty
was deserved for certain acts changed. Throughout the twentieth
century, there has been a widespread shift away from mandatory
death sentences. Certainly by the time Woodson v. North Caro-
lina12 outlawed mandatory death penalties in 1976, the change had
been substantially accomplished.
The concern with arbitrary imposition of the death penalty evi-
denced by Furman v. Georgia'3 in 1972, shows that a change in
thinking already had occurred. Today, death penalty proponents
regard arbitrariness in the capital system as morally insignificant.
From their point of view, a lack of consistency simply indicates
that some persons who deserve to be executed escape justice; an
unfortunate circumstance, but not one that requires abolition of
the death penalty. Proponents similarly view as irrelevant appar-
ent racism, class bias, gender discrimination, victim impact and
other inconsistencies in the imposition of the death penalty.
Based on the assumptions underlying the mandatory system,
proponents of the death penalty are correct to ignore arbitrariness.
We would not, for example, abolish the criminal justice system be-
cause every criminal is not arrested, even if the arrests that do oc-
cur are predictably biased along race and class lines.
What gives the arbitrariness criticism its moral weight, however,
is the contrary assumption that there are judgments to be made in
death penalty cases that are similar to the judgments made about
guilt and innocence. The Supreme Court in Furman accepted the
view of a non-mandatory system that only some murderers actu-
ally deserve the death penalty. However, the prevailing criminal
justice system showed no sign that it could make the proper judg-
ments about who deserved to be executed.14
12. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
13. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that the imposition and carrying out of the
Georgia and Texas death penalties, at the full discretion of the jury, constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
14. See id.
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The assumption that only certain murderers deserve execution
underlies the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gregg v. Georgia,15
which held that a death penalty statute must ensure that the sen-
tencing authority is given adequate information and guidance in a
formal sentencing hearing. Prior to Furman, governors and jurors
often had complete discretion to impose a life sentence or the
death penalty. After Gregg, however, the death penalty sentencing
procedures must be designed to achieve "reliable" results."6 But,
worrying about reliability assumes there is a "correct" answer to
the death penalty question in a particular case. It follows that a
capital defendant is entitled to the correct answer. In this struc-
ture mitigating evidence is not a plea for mercy; it is a demand for
justice.
Proponents of the death penalty usually do not discuss the ac-
tual system we have, but instead discuss the mandatory structure.
This is because the post-Gregg understanding of the death penalty
cannot give an account of why a particular defendant deserves to
be executed. The reason cannot be categorical, such as intentional
killing, for that would be true of all murderers. Nor can the reason
be a sub-category, such as torture or a long record, for then all
such persons would deserve execution. This explains why death
penalty proponents speak in terms of a mandatory structure rather
than discussing the system as it exists today.
Generally speaking, what distinguishes murderers who receive
the death penalty from those who are sentenced to life imprison-
ment is the admission at their trials of substantial mitigating evi-
dence. But mitigation by its nature cannot fully account for the
distribution of death sentences.
Mitigating evidence in death penalty cases typically purports to
represent the causes of criminal behavior. Such evidence seeks to
explain why the prisoner acted the way he did. Perhaps the de-
fendant was abused as a child or was a drug addict. In this sense,
most explanatory evidence will require a scientific, indeed psycho-
logical, examination of the criminal defendant.
15. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
16. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 305 (stating the Eighth Amendment requires
"reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case"). See also California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1987) (upholding jury instruction
to ignore "mere ... sympathy" on the ground that such an instruction introduces greater
reliability in capital sentencing).
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But as the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas has said,
"[e]verything can be explained by its causes. . . .,,1 According to
this philosophy, no one is responsible, no one could be responsible,
for the forces that have shaped him as a person. No five-year-old
chooses to become the man who tortures a child to death. Either
outside forces twisted his life or a criminal possessed genetic flaws
at birth. In either case, a criminal is not fully responsible. This
causal analysis raises serious questions about the meaningfulness
of personal responsibility.
This paper is not the occasion to assess the causal account of
human behavior. Perhaps no one is fully responsible for his ac-
tions; this may be the best reason for not having an ultimate pen-
alty, a penalty of death. The problem with a causal analysis in the
death penalty context is that it cannot distinguish between those
who deserve to die and those who do not. If sufficient mitigating
evidence is presented, no criminal defendant will deserve to be ex-
ecuted. Everyone's actions will be explained by their causes.
This discussion may seem only tangentially related to the topic
of commutation. But the failure to rationally justify executive com-
mutation of death sentences resides in the unfathomable justifica-
tion for the current death penalty system.
C. The Changing Face of Commutation
The traditional role of mercy in commutation has little place in
the modern death penalty structure. A criminal defendant with
substantial mitigating factors that explain his criminal behavior
does not need mercy, but justice. Such a prisoner is entitled to the
reliability in sentencing that the Supreme Court has promised.'8 A
few state courts, notably Pennsylvania, have maintained the view
that capital sentencing is discretionary. Therefore, erroneous fact-
finding at this stage cannot be corrected on appeal. In one case, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed a death sentence where a
jury failed to find in its evaluation of mitigating circumstances that
the prisoner had no prior criminal record, despite a prosecution
stipulation to that effect. 9 But under the modern view of the
death penalty such cases must be reversed. The prisoner who is the
17. EMMANUEL LEVINAS, DIFFICULT FREEDOM 25 (Se§n Hand trans., 1990).
18. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
19. Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d 1353 (Pa. 1991).
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victim of bad fact-finding deserves reliable fact-finding; he does
not need mercy.
Are there any contexts left where an appeal for mercy may lead
to commutation? What of the prisoner in whose case aggravating
factors outweigh mitigating evidence? Could a governor show
mercy in such a case? Of course, one is inclined to ask why, short
of a belief in abolition of the death penalty itself, any governor
would want to commute the death sentence of such a prisoner.
There is, however, a fundamental flaw in this formulation of the
commutation issue. Despite the prevalence of the rhetoric of
weighing aggravation against mitigation, the terms are not
commensurate.
Aggravation refers to the awfulness of either the crime or the
defendant, or both - a torture killing by a criminal with a signifi-
cant prior history, for example. Mitigation is not an attempt to
minimize the atrocity of either the crime or the defendant's record.
The point of mitigation is to explain how the defendant came to
commit criminal acts. As a result, it is often the case that the
worse the aggravation, the more impressive the mitigating evi-
dence. The person most likely to receive the death penalty under
these circumstances may be the typical criminal who shoots a clerk
during a hold-up. Even in this case, the problem is not that the
aggravation outweighs anything, but that the story of mitigation is
not dramatic enough to impress the sentencer because it did not
have a horrible enough act or record to explain. A governor cannot
be led to mercy by the rhetoric of weighing.
The foregoing does not mean there is no place today for commu-
tation. It does mean, however, that commutation must represent
more than a simple extension of mercy. We propose three models
for commutation. First, a governor may act to correct an error in
the prisoner's trial proceedings. Second, a governor may act in re-
sponse to circumstances that have changed since the trial. Finally,
a governor may exercise widespread commutation, allowing the
death penalty to remain theoretically valid, but rarely applied.
This last possibility is inspired by Levinas.
1. Correcting Mistakes and Omissions
Today, the most common ground for pleas for commutation, is
newly discovered evidence. By and large, this is evidence that logi-
cally, if not practically, could have been introduced at trial. Often
[Vol. 27:227
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this evidence represents new mitigating factors. Occasionally, the
new evidence will relate to guilt, leading either to exoneration of
the prisoner or a reduction of a prisoner's conviction to a degree of
homicide less than capital murder. For example, perhaps the pris-
oner was guilty of no more than manslaughter.
The judicial system has a difficult time dealing with these new
evidence claims. Although the courts clearly are influenced by the
rhetoric of innocence, the traditional judicial concern is with error,
not outcome. The fact that a defendant's best possible case was
not presented at trial is usually not sufficient cause for judicial in-
tervention, unless the omissions were the result of legal violations,
such as ineffective assistance of counsel. This traditional judicial
paralysis in the face of untimely new evidence of innocence was at
issue in Herrera v. Collins,20 recently argued before the Supreme
Court.
In contrast, a governor has no limitation upon his ability to con-
sider new evidence at the commutation stage. Although most do
not, a governor can evaluate whether the proper outcome was at-
tained at trial. Thus, a governor may examine all evidence, derived
from any source, that was either before the sentencer originally, or
is truly, newly available. In addition, a governor need not be con-
cerned with the problem of waiver. The flexible process of commu-
tation is not as threatened by last-minute claims and evidence as is
the judicial process.
The idea that a governor takes into account what the jury did
not hear, is a straight-forward role for commutation. If governors
do not act in such cases, the reasons are political, not conceptual.
For that matter, since this role could be satisfactorily explained to
the public, the true reason governors fail to commute death
sentences is timidity, rather than politics. The same is true when
evidentiary standards such as waiver and burden of proof are ap-
plied at the commutation stage to lessen the impact of new evi-
dence. The standard for governors should be straight-forward;
what would a reasonable fact-finder have done if this evidence had
been presented at trial. This standard allows a governor to substi-
tute himself for the sentencer, thus justifying his action with the
20. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). As this article was going to print, the Supreme Court held that
habeus corpus relief generally does not lie in such a case. Id. The Court suggested a role for
executive commutation similar to that proposed in this part.
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rationale that the prisoner would have received a lesser sentence in
a more perfect system.
A governor's other role concerns errors that should have been
corrected by others, but were not. Examples of such mistakes in-
clude: a sentence that is clearly against the weight of the mitigat-
ing evidence or is flawed in some other way; a prosecutor who is
allowed to engage in inflammatory argument; or a defense attorney
who is so incompetent as to deny the defendant a fair trial.
For a governor to act in this context requires a degree of political
courage. For here, someone has made an error, either in the first
instance or by failing to correct mistakes and a governor cannot
avoid saying so. In this context, the mistakes will have to be clear
before a governor will take action. The commutation advocate here
must persuade the governor that life is the outcome that the judi-
cial system should have produced.
2. Changes in the Prisoner
In contrast to the previous section, the sentencer may have pos-
sessed all the information pertinent to the case. On the eve of exe-
cution, however, typically many years later, the circumstances of
the case may often have changed. The classic instance of this situa-
tion, and a common one, is a change in the prisoner himself; he is
now remorseful or has demonstrated himself to be a worthwhile
member of society by becoming educated, or behaving himself well.
A change of great magnitude in a prisoner's attitude does not fit
easily into the current death penalty system. Although a defend-
ant's remorse is admissible as mitigating evidence at a sentencing
hearing, it is different from other forms of mitigation. Such evi-
dence does not purport to explain the causes of human behavior.
One could assert that such changes in the defendant do reflect
the causal theory. Perhaps the defendant has changed because the
forces that caused him to commit criminal acts, such as drugs or
street life, now have been removed by prison discipline and time.
Thus, the prisoner's true nature has been clarified. If a more accu-
rate assessment of a defendant's character had been available at
the trial, the outcome would have been different. In this way, a
convict's remorse is properly characterized as mitigating evidence.
However, this account of remorse remains somewhat unsatisfac-
tory. A fact-finder's consideration of evidence of remorse raises
[Vol. 27:227
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fundamental questions regarding the modern justification for the
death penalty. Even proponents of the death penalty often will ad-
mit that there is no point in executing someone who, years later, is
utterly different from the ruthless being who committed the origi-
nal crime. But, if that were so, execution always should be post-
poned and ultimately abandoned because the sixty-year-old death
row convict consistently will be different from his twenty-year-old
former self. The possibility of change renders strict justice
impossible.
The attraction for the prisoner who has changed is surprisingly
difficult to articulate. The conceptual problem with remorse,
whether the prisoner later becomes remorseful or feels great sorrow
at his original trial, is that remorse conflicts with all other grounds
of mitigation. Generally, mitigation reduces the prisoner's respon-
sibility for his acts by demonstrating causes for behavior over
which the criminal had little control. Remorse, on the other hand,
must be the act of a morally free person who accepts responsibility
for his behavior and its consequences. Thus, while mitigation is a
step away from full humanity, remorse is a step toward true
humanity.
It seems unjust to execute a person who was starved and beaten
as a child who hardly could have avoided becoming ruthlessly vio-
lent. But it does not seem unjust, though it may be immoral, to
execute some criminals who truly are sorry for their actions. Such
prisoners will even admit that they deserve full punishment for
their crime. For this reason, the remorseful criminal can ask only
for mercy, not for justice. The idea of remorse is tied to the older
view that the commission of certain acts deserves the death pen-
alty, along with that view's religious foundations.
Since the public still accepts, in part, that older view, there is a
role for commutation. In the abstract, the public probably can ap-
prove of merciful commutation for dramatically changed prisoners.
The political problem is quelling suspicions of dissembling: is the
prisoner only pretending to have changed? One solution would be
to allow a prisoner to make his case to the public, through media
interviews for example. If the public becomes convinced that the
prisoner is reformed, the governor will have a mandate to act.
1993]
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3. Commutation in Every Case
Opponents of the death penalty are often criticized for seeking
commutation in every case; they are perceived to lack sincerity. Of
course abolitionists believe that no one should be executed and
would be happy if commutation became the political vehicle which
accomplished their goal. But, as we have seen in our examination
of the current system, it is plausible that there are reasons in every
death sentence case for commutation. With introduction of enough
explanation, mitigating factors can always be said to outweigh ag-
gravation. The incoherence of the modern formulation should not
be blamed upon the abolitionist.
There is, however, a more profound possibility of commutation
in every case. Emmanuel Levinas explains in his essay on the lex
talionis the virtues of the Jewish approach of retaining the letter
of the death penalty while as a practical matter hardly ever execut-
ing anyone. 1 Certain crimes are so heinous that they call for an
extraordinary response. Homicide is more reprehensible than any
other crime. Theoretically, the death sentence is an appropriate
punishment in such cases.
However, according to Levinas, man must never kill in the name
of justice. Indeed, he defines Judaism as the quest "to be without
being a murderer."22 Rabbis dealt with this tension by adopting
rules of procedure and evidence in capital cases that never could
be satisfied. A governor could accomplish the same result by com-
muting the penalty from death to life in every death penalty case.
These commutations would not represent abolition. The gover-
nor would agree that the prisoner deserves to die. However, there
is an important difference between deserving to die and killing.
Even a justified killing is a killing. When justice requires killing,
there is an obligation to find a way not to do justice.
It is not realistic in the current political atmosphere to expect a
governor to commute every sentence of death. Yet, the death pen-
alty pollutes each member of society by its violence. And, the same
forces in society that allow huge numbers of murders to take place,
prevent a reaction of horror in response to an execution. Neverthe-
less, the horror of violence is a sounder foundation for commuta-
tion than is excessive sympathy for the murderer. Perhaps this
21. LEVINAS, supra note 17, at 146-47.
22. Id. at 100.
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foundation could persuade the public that widespread use of com-
mutation is appropriate.

